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Consequences of Converting a 
Bankruptcy Case 
by 
David G. Epstein* 
This paper discusses some of the consequences of converting a bank-
ruptcy case from one chapter to another. 
At present, there are four different forms of bankruptcy: chapter 7, 
chapter 9, chapter 11, chapter 13. Congress is currently considering creating 
yet a fifth form of bankruptcy for farmers. Most individual debtors are now 
eligible for relief under three of the chapters, 7, 11, or 13.1 Corporate and 
partnership debtors can now choose between chapter 7 and chapter 11. 
The various chapters of the Bankruptcy Code differ in both policy and 
particulars. A chapter 7 case involves liquidation of the "property of the es-
tate"2-usually as promptly as practicable. In the typical chapter 11 case or 
chapter 13 case, the debtor's "property of the estate" is not liquidated. 
Rather, the debtor retains his, her or its3 property. Creditors are paid 
pursuant to a court-approved plan out of future earnings. 
Bankruptcy concepts such as "property of the estate" are common to 
chapters 7, 11, and 13. Chapter 1 of the Bankruptcy Code, General 
Provisions, chapter 3 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case Administration, and 
chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, Creditors, the Debtor and the Estate, 
generally apply to all bankruptcy cases. 4 The application of these basic 
bankruptcy concepts, however, varies from chapter to chapter. For example, 
the term "property of the estate" has a different meaning in a chapter 13 case 
from a chapter 7 or 11 case.5 
*Dean and Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Emory University. 
•Section 109 sets out who is eligible to be a debtor for each chapter. There is nothing in the language 
of section 109 that would prevent an individual debtor who is eligible for relief under chapter 13 to pro-
ceed under chapter 11 instead. In In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1985}, the court reversed the 
lower courts' dismissal of a consumer debtor's chapter 11 petition: "We see nothing in the current Bank-
ruptcy Code or its legislative history or the Bankruptcy Act that would suggest that a consumer debtor 
may not seek relief under chapter 11." 774 F.2d at 1075. But cf. In re Winshall Settler's Trust, 758 F.2d 
1136, 1137 (6th Cir. 1985). 
2See 11 U.S.C. section 541. In the remaining footnotes, provisions of the Bankruptcy Code will be 
cited simply to the appropriate section number. 
3In the remainder of the article, the pronouns "he" and "his" will be used in a way that is intended as 
sexually neutral. Honest! 
4Section 103. 
ssee section 1306. See generally H. DRAKE &J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURI! § 
5.09 (1983). 
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If a debtor is dissatisfied with his initial choice of a chapter, he can 
change his mind and choose another chapter. Section 706 governs conver-
sion from chapter 7; section 1112 deals with conversion from chapter 11; 
section 1307 controls conversion from chapter 13. A motion to convert can 
be filed by either the debtor or by a "party in interest." Generally, motions 
to convert are filed by debtors who after trying to effect a rehabilitation 
under chapter 11 or chapter 13 now want to liquidate under chapter 7. 
I. STATUTORY PROVISION AND RULE: OVERVIEW OF SEC-
TION 348 AND RULE 1019 
Section 348 and Rule 1019 deal with the consequences of such a conver-
sion. Section 348 is divided into five lettered paragraphs. Paragraph (a) es-
tablishes the general rule that the important date in a converted case is the 
date that the original petition was filed-that date will be deemed the date 
of the "filing of the petition," the date of the "commencement of the case," 
and the date of the "order for relief." Paragraphs (b) and (c) set out a number 
of specific exceptions to this general rule-detail those situations in which 
the date of the order of conversion shall be the important date. Paragraph 
( d) provides that a claim against the estate or the debtors that arises after 
the order for relief but before conversion shall be treated for all purposes as if 
such claim had arisen immediately before the filing of the petition, unless the 
claim qualified as an administrative expense in which case it shall be treated 
as an administrative expense even after conversion. Paragraph (e) termi-
nates the service of any trustee or examiner who was serving before the 
conversion. 
Rule 1019 is divided into eight paragraphs.6 Paragraph (1) deals with 
lists and statements filed prior to conversion: lists and statements filed in the 
"superseded" chapter 11 or chapter 13 case shall be deemed filed in the chap-
ter 7 case after conversion. Paragraph (2) requires notice to creditors of the 
order of conversion. Paragraph (3) deals with time limits in a "reconversion" 
- chapter 7 to chapter 11 or 13 and then back to chapter 7.7 Under para-
graph (4), all claims filed in the "superseded" chapter 11 or chapter 13 case 
shall be deemed filed in the chapter 7 case. Paragraph (5) covers turnover of 
records and property of the estate to the chapter 7 trustee. Paragraph (6) re-
quires the debtor in possession or trustee in the superseded case to file re-
6See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 348.07 (15th ed. 1986). 
'Note that Rule 1019(3) speaks only of the effect of reconversion - 7 to 13 back to 7 - on time limits 
for filing claims and discharge complaints. What is the effect of a mere conversion - 11 to 7? Is there a 
"negative pregnant" in Rule 1019(3}? F & M Marquette National Bank v. Rkhards, 780 F.2d 24 (8th 
Cir. 1985), held that the conversion of a case from chapter 11 to chapter 7 generated a new time period 
for dischargeability complaints. 
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port and schedule of postpetition debts. Paragraph (7) calls for notice to the 
holders of postpetition, preconversion claims of the time for filing proofs of 
their claims. Under paragraph (8), any extension of time for the filing of a 
claim against surplus shall be applicable to holders of postpetition claims 
who failed to timely file under paragraph (7). 
While section 348 and Rule 1019 deal with the consequences of 
conversion in considerable detail, there are still a number of questions 
arising from the conversion of a bankruptcy case from chapter 11 or 13 to 
chapter 7 that courts have been called on to answer: 
(1) When a chapter 13 case is converted to chapter 7, are the debtor's 
postpetition/preconversion earnings included in the property of the estate? 
(2) When a chapter 13 case is converted to chapter 7, what property 
can the debtor claim as exempt? 
(3) When a chapter 11 case is converted to chapter 7, do creditors have 
to file proofs of claim? 
JI. CONVERSION FROM CHAPTER 13 TO CHAPTER 7 AND 
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
A. THE PROBLEM 
Assume, for example, that Floyd Lawson files a chapter 13 petition on 
January 15. On April 5, Floyd files a motion to convert to chapter 7 and a 
conversion order is entered. Are Floyd's earnings from January 15 to April 5 
included in the "property of the estate" in the chapter 7 case? 
B. WHAT THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES AND DOES NOT SAY ABOUT THIS 
PROBLEM 
As earlier noted, the concept of property of the estate is common to 
both chapter 13 and chapter 7. In chapter 13, however, property of the es, 
tate includes more than it does in chapter 7. Under section 541, property of 
the estate is generally limited to the debtor's interest in property "as of the 
commencement of the case," i.e., the debtor's property as of the time of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. Section 1306, however, "broadens the 
definition of property of the estate for chapter 13 purposes to include all 
property acquired and all earnings from services performed by the debtor 
after the commencement of the case." Thus, Floyd's earnings from January 
15th to April 5th are property of the estate so long as he remains in chapter 
13. Do these earnings remain property of the estate after the case is convert, 
ed to chapter 7? 
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It is clear from section 348(a) that Floyd's chapter 7 case is to be treated 
as filed on January 15th. It is not clear whether it is to be treated as if it 
were filed as a chapter 7 case on January 15th. 
C. CASE LAW SUPPORTING THE POSITION THAT PosTPETITIO:to/ 
PRECONVERSION EARNINGS ARE PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
In re Lindberg, a a June, 1984, case, is the only circuit court decision that 
directly speaks to the question of whether property of the estate includes 
postpetition/preconversion earnings when a chapter 13 case is converted to 
chapter 7. Under Lindberg, Floyd's earnings from January 15th to April 5th 
would be property of the estate. The Eighth Circuit there states, by way of 
dictum, "The bankruptcy courts are in general agreement that in a case con-
verted from chapter 13 to chapter 7 the property of the estate consists of all 
property in which the debtor has an interest on the date of conversion. "9 
This quotation from Lindberg was dictum. The question before the 
Eighth Circuit in Lindberg was whether the date of filing the initial chapter 
13 petition or the date of the order of conversion to chapter 7 was the 
relevant date for determining what exemptions may be claimed. At the time 
of their chapter 13 petition, the Lindbergs lived in their home in New 
Town, and claimed this house as their homestead. Prior to the conversion of 
their case to chapter 13, the Lindbergs moved to their farm in Burke 
County. They now wanted to claim this farm as their homestead. The 
Eighth Circuit reasoned that since the property of the estate is determined 
as of the time of conversion, this should also be the time which should 
control exemptions. 
In stating that the time of conversion determines what is property of the 
estate, the Eighth Circuit did not quote from or even cite to section 348. 
Rather, the court cited three bankruptcy court decisions: In re 'fracy,10 In re 
Stinson, 11 and In re Richardson.12 
In Tracy, the debtor filed a chapter 13 petition on December 4, 1981. On 
July 23, 1982, the debtor converted to chapter 7 and moved for turnover of 
$270 in postpetition/preconversion wages which his employer withheld and 
delivered to the chapter 13 trustee. In denying the debtor's turnover 
motion, the Maine bankruptcy court looked to section 348(a)-"To state 
that even after conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 this case is to be 
8735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984). 
9735 F.2d at 1090. Contra In re Lepper, 58 Banlcr. 896, 898 (Banlcr. Md. 1986). 
10In re Tracy, 10 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 541 (Banlcr. Me. 1983). 
11In re Stinson, 8 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 16 (Banlcr. Or. 1982). This ruling was reversed by 
the district court of Oregon in an opinion that was officially reported. The district court opinion in 
Stinson can be found in 52 Bankr. 454, where it is published as an appendix to In re· Kao, 52 Banlcr. 452 
(Banlcr. Or. 1985). 
1220 Bankr. 490 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1982). 
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treated as commencing on December 4, 1981, does not necessarily imply 
that after conversion this case must be treated as a Chapter 7 case commenc-
ing on December 4, 1981."13 After noting the question left unanswered by 
the language of paragraph (a) of section 348, Judge Goodman looked to 
section 348(d) for an answer. ''Treating wages earned after the filing of the 
chapter 13 petition but prior to the conversion of the case to chapter 7 as 
property of the estate is consistent with the treatment under the Bankrupt-
cy Code of claims against the debtor which arose during the same period."14 
As die 'Tracy opinion correctly points out, excluding postpetition/precon-
version property from property of the estate would mean that a debtor who 
first filed a chapter 13 petition and then filed a motion to convert to chapter 
7 would be treated more favorably than a debtor who simply filed a chapter 
7 petition: because the debtor converted to chapter 7, his bankruptcy covers 
both prepetition and postpetition/preconversion creditors.15 
Stinson, 16 the second of the cases cited by the Eighth Circuit in Lindberg 
is, like Lindberg, a case involving an exemption claim; in Stinson, the Oregon 
Legislature enacted a statute opting out of the ·federal exemptions after the 
debtors filed their chapter 13 petition and before the conversion order. In 
Stinson, like Lindberg, the court's reasoning emphasized concern about a 
debtor benefitting by first filing a chapter 13 petition and then converting to 
chapter 7: 
If the court were to conclude otherwise, a debtor with sub-
stantial assets which would not be exempt in a chapter 7 
case, could file a petition under chapter 13, obtain confirma-
tion of a plan based solely upon payments to the trustee 
from future earnings, be revested with the title to all of the 
nonexempt property and obtain a discharge of not only 
those debts in existence at the time of the chapter 13 peti-
tion but also those incurred thereafter prior to conversion.1' 
Richardson, 18 the third of the cases that Lindberg cites and relies on, was ac-
tually two independent cases dealt with in a single opinion. In holding that the 
postpetition/preconversion earnings of the Richardsons were property of the 
estate, the bankruptcy court for the Western District of New Yark looked to 
UIO BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR), at 542. But cf. In re Dennis, 10 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR), 930, 932 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) ("This court is of the opinion that when Debtor converted her Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7, she is deemed to have filed a Chapter 7 case at the time her Chapter 13 case was filed.") (dic-
tum). In re Bullock, IO COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 1292, 1295 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("under section 
348 (a) the case is deemed filed under Chapter 7 as of the date the original petition under Chapter 13 was 
filed") (dictum). 
14Jd. 
"See supra note 1 at IO BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 542. 
168 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 16 (Bankr. Or. 1982). 
178 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB), at 18. , 
1s9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 197 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1982).1 
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section 1327. Under section 1327(a), a confirmed plan is binding on the 
debtor and all creditors. 19 Judge Hayes reasoned from this: 
The creditors of the debtor were given the interest in those 
wages provided by the plan and the order confirming the 
plan. Had these wages been paid to the creditors their in· 
terest would have vested. However, since the wages 
because of disputes as to claims were never paid to the 
creditors they became part of the Chapter 7 estate. 20 
In the very next paragraph of the opinion, the court reaches a very dif-
ferent conclusion with respect to the other debtors, Mr. and Mrs. Vasquez. 
The Vasquez plan had not been confirmed at the time of the conversion. 
The court thus looked solely at section 348(a) and summarily concluded that 
"When the Vasquez case converted, the conversion related the creation of 
the estate back to the original filing under Chapter 13. The Chapter 7 case 
then created (emphasis added) consisted only of the property set forth in 
section 541."21 [Compare this language with the quotation from the 'Tracy 
case three paragraphs earlier. Arguably, the court in "Vasquez" is implying 
what 'Tracy is denying.} 
There were other bankruptcy court decisions that the Eighth Circuit 
could have cited in Lindberg to support the conclusion that postpeti-
tion/preconversion earnings remain property of the estate even after con-
version from chapter 13 to chapter 7. In January of 1984, for example, the 
bankruptcy court for the Western District of New York reached this result 
in In re Wanderlich22 by looking to paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 348. Like 
Judge Goodman in 'Tracy, Judge McGuire reasoned that since the Code 
treated claims which occurred after the filing of the chapter 13 petition and 
before the conversion of the case as prepetition claims in the chapter 7 case, 
it was logical to treat the date of conversion to chapter 7 as the date for de-
termining property of the estate. In Wanderlich, Judge McGuire also looked 
to section 548(c) which permits the assumption/rejection of postpeti• 
tion/preconversion executory contracts-"an impossibility if those interests 
were not a part of the estate following confirmation."23 
There is an earlier Eighth Circuit decision that the Eighth Circuit could 
have cited and discussed in Lindberg, Resendez v. Lindquist. 24 Resendez, like 
19See generally H. DRAKE&]. Moarus, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 11.10 (1983). 
209 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR), at 198. But cf. In re Genova, 43 Bankr. 108, 110 (Bankr. Colo. 1984) 
(upon conversion, section 1327 "became ineffective"). 
21Id. 
2211 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 467 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1984). 
"11 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR), at 469. 
24691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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Lindberg, dealt with a claim of exemptions; there the debtors, who convert-
ed from chapter 13 to chapter 7 after confirmation of their plan, tried to 
exempt funds paid to the chapter 13 trustee. The Eighth Circuit in Resendez 
held that the funds were part of the estate but not exemptible. This holding 
in Resendez seems consistent with the statement in Lindberg that property 
of the estate is to be determined as of the date of conversion and it has been 
so cited.25 
Unlike Lindberg and the cases cited therein, the Resendez decision 
avoids any statement about the date of conversion as being the controlling 
date. Such language is disturbing for two reasons. First, there is no direct 
basis in the language of section 348 for it. Paragraph (a) of the section 348 
expressly makes the date of the initial filing the relevant date for most pur-
poses. Paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 348 specifically detail those 
situations in which the date of the conversion order is to be the relevant 
date. Second, a date of conversion test could produce bizarre results where a 
chapter 11 case involving a non-business debtor26 is converted to a chapter 7 
case. Neither chapter 11 nor chapter 7 generally include postpetition earn-
ings of the debtor in property of the estate. Nevertheless, under a literal ap-
plication of the language in cases like Lindberg and Stinson, 21 it could be 
argued that if Floyd Lawson filed a chapter 11 petition on January 15th and 
converted it to chapter 7 on April 5th, his earnings from January 15th to 
April 5th would be property of the estate. 
A court can include postpetition/preconversion earnings in property of 
the estate without using a date of conversion test. It can instead simply con-
clude that where a debtor files a chapter 13 petition and then converts to 
chapter 7, the case will be treated as a chapter 13 case from the time of filing 
until the time of conversion. Dictum in 'Tracy suggests this approach.28 
D. CASE LAW SUPPORTING THE Pos1TION THAT PosTPETITION/PREcoN-
VERSION EARNINGS ARE N._Q'f PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
Lindberg et al represent the majority rule: postpetition/preconversion 
earnings are property of the chapter 7 estate. "Vasquez," however, is not 
the only case to the contrary. 
2
'E.g., In re Wanderlich, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 467, 468 (Banlrr. W.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Pe-
ters, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 881, 885 et seq (Banlrr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). 
26fu the typical business chapter 11 case, the vast majority of the postpetition/preconversion proper-
ty will be generated from property of the estate and is thus property of the estate under section 
541(a)(7). See In re Ford, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) , 71, 188, at page 89, 186 (Banlrr. W.D. Wisc. 1986). 
Not all chapter 11 cases, however, are business cases. See In re Fitzsimmons, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 
799 (9th Cir. 1984) (attorney in chapter 11 entitled to earnings attnbutable to his personal services): see 
generally Herbert, Consumer Chapter 11 Proceedings, 91 CoM. L. J. 234 (1986). 
27See also In re Winchester, 12 CoLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 293, 296-7 (Banlrr. 9th Cir. 1984). 
2ssee op cit supra note 12. 
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In one of the first reported cases on this question, In re Hannan,29 the 
bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of New York relied on the 
language of section 348(a) to hold that property of the estate was deter, 
mined as of the date of the original chapter 13 petition. There is also a brief 
discussion of policy in the Hannan opinion; Judge Goetz writes, 
When a Chapter 13 plan does not work out, the debtor has 
the privilege of converting to Chapter 7, and, when he exer, 
cises that right, no reason of policy suggests itself why the 
creditors should not be put back in precisely the same posi, 
tion as they would have been had the debtor never sought 
to repay his debts by filing under Chapter 13.30 
There is, of course, a problem with this statement from Hannan. Section 
348( d) does not leave the creditors in "precisely the same position as they 
would have been had the debtor never sought to repay his debts by filing 
under Chapter 13." In re Peters,31 a bankruptcy court decision for the Mid, 
dle District of Tennessee, and In re Lepper,32 a bankruptcy court decision 
from Maryland, deal with this problem directly. 
Peters is a post,Lindberg case involving debtors who converted from 
chapter 13 to chapter 7 after their chapter 13 plan was confirmed. In con, 
eluding that the postpetition/preconversion ear~gs of the debtor were not 
property of the estate, Judge Paine discussed and disregarded the statutory 
symmetry arguments advanced in Tracy and Wanderlich. He concluded that 
these policy arguments were outweighed by the Congressional policy of en, 
couraging debtors to try chapter 13: 
Both the Tracy decision and the Wanderlich decision ignore 
the congressional policy to encourage debtors to file 
Chapter 13 plans and ignore the fact that certain benefits 
are provided to Chapter 13 creditors as an incentive. One 
such benefit, leaving the date of the filing of the petition un, 
changed by conversion, is provided by the Code as long as 
the debtor remains in bankruptcy. The Wanderlich court ig, 
nores the fact that the Code provides benefits to those who 
are in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy which it does not provide to 
299 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1151 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982). 
309 BANKR. CT. Dec. (CRR) at 1152. 
31 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 881 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). 
3258 Bankr. 896. Lepper involved a significant amount of property. There Dr. Lepper ftled a chapter 
13 petition in November of 1979. The case was converted to chapter 7 on April 5, 1984. At issue was 
the accounts receivable derived from services performed by Dr. Lepper during this four and a half year 
period. Judge Mannes looked to sections 54l(a)(6), 1306, and 348(a) and concluded that they are "clear 
and unambiguous." Under the "plain meaning" of these provisions, Dr. Lepper's chapter 7 case is deemed 
to have commenced in November of 1979-accordingly, section 1306 is inapplicable-accordingly, the 
postpetition/preconversion accounts are not property of the estate. 
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other debtors. The Tracy decision ignores not only the con-
gressional intent to encourage debtors to file a Chapter 13 
petition, but it also ignores the statutory scheme of 11 
U.S.C. section 348 and the specific language of both 11 
U.S.C. section 348 and 11 U.S.C. section 541. It is true, 
that "[b Jecause the debtor converted to chapter 7, ... cred-
itors whose claims arose after the original chapter 13 filing, 
but before conversion to chapter 7, would share in the es-
tate along with the pre-filing creditors, to the detriment of 
the latter." Tracy at 190-191 n.l. However, this detriment 
is contemplated by the Code in section 348 and may be 
viewed as an expense incurred by creditors in an attempt to 
encourage debtors to repay a greater portion of their debts 
than required under chapter 7 of the Code. 33 
347 
In the Lepper opinion, Judge Mannes questions the present practical sig-
nificance of section 348(d) after the addition of section 1325(b) and the 
amendment to section 1329 in 1984. Because section 1325(b) compels a 
chapter 13 debtor to commit all of his disposable income to the chapter 13 
plan and because section 1329 now permits a trustee to request modification 
of a chapter 13 plan where the debtor's income increases, the Code now "ef-
fectively precludes payments outside the plan to postpetition creditors."34 
This leads Judge Mannes to conclude "The 1984 Amendments deal with 
the policy considerations expressed in Wanderlich and Stinson and result in 
the elimination of the abuses foreseen by those courts."35 
I respectfully question this conclusion. While I cannot point to any fed-
erally funded empirical study on whether anyone has received credit after 
he has filed a chapter 13 petition, I believe that sellers and lenders are 
continuing to extend credit to chapter 13 debtors. If so, the abuses foreseen 
in Wanderlich have not been eliminated by the 1984 Amendments. The 
issue of symmetry between paragraphs (a) and (d) of section 348 has not 
been eliminated. 
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The cases identify countervailing policy considerations. On the one 
hand, the Congressional policy of encouraging chapter 13 filings suggests 
that a debtor should realize no disadvantage because he first tried chapter 13 
rather than filing under chapter 7 initially. On the other hand, 36 the policy of 
3311 CowER B/\NKR. CAs. 2d (MB), at 887. 
3458 Bankr., at 898. 
3•Id. 
36Cf. Randy Travis, "On the Other Hand" (1986). 
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symmetry suggests that postpetition earnings should be brought into the 
bankruptcy since postpetition claims are covered by the bankruptcy. Be-
cause it is not clear from the language of section 348 whether a case 
commenced under chapter 13 and then converted to chapter 7 should be 
treated as a chapter 7 case from the time of the first filing, these countervail-
ing policy considerations are relevant. 
ID. CONVERSION FROM CHAPTER 13 TO CHAPTER 7 AND 
EXEMPTIONS 
There are obvious connections between the consequences of conversion 
on property of the estate and the consequences of conversion on exempt 
property. Obviously, here, again it is important to determine whether to 
focus on the date of the initial filing or the date of conversion. Obviously, a 
court that has concluded that property of the estate is to be determined as of 
the date of conversion is likely to conclude that exemptions are to be 
determined as of the date of conversion. 37 And, obviously, if a court has 
concluded that the debtor's postpetition/preconversion earnings are not 
property of the estate, it will not be necessary to determine if these earnings 
can be claimed as exempt-the debtor can keep these earnings without 
claiming an exemption. 38 
This part of the article considers some less obvious exemption questions 
raised by the conversion of a case from chapter 13 to chapter 7. 
A. PROBLEMS 
Assume, again, that Floyd Lawson files a chapter 13 petition on January 
15th. He also files a chapter 13 statement identifying exempt property. On 
April 5th, Floyd files a motion to convert to chapter 7 and an order of con-
version is entered. This conversion can create a number of different 
exemption issues. What if the exemption law in North Carolina39 changed 
between January 15th and April 5th? What if the nature of or use of his 
property has changed so that it would no longer meet the requirements of 
the state exemption statute? What if the value of the property that Floyd 
identified as "exempt" has changed? 
»E.g., In Te Winchester, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 293 (Bankr. ~th Cir. 1984); In Te \Van-
derlich, 11 BANKR. CT. Dec. (CRR) 467 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1984). 
38In re Vasquez, 9 BANKR. CT. Dec. (CRR) 197, 198 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1982); In re Lepper, 58 
Bankr. 896, 898 (Bankr. Md. 1986). 
39Remember, Mayberry, North Carolina. 
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B. PosTPETITIONjPRECONVERSION CHANGES IN STATE ExEMPTION 
STATUTES 
349 
Between the date that the Stinsons filed their chapter 13 petition and 
the date that they converted to chapter 7, the Oregon law regarding 
exemptions changed; the Oregon legislature enacted a statute "opting out" 
of the federal exemptions. Thus, at the time that the Stinsons filed their 
original petition, debtors could choose either the federal exemption provided 
by section 522(d) or the state exemptions pursuant to section 522(b)(2). At 
the time of the conversion of their case to chapter 7, Oregon debtors then 
filing for chapter 7 relief could only claim the exemptions under section 
522(b)(2). After the conversion, the Stinsons filed exemption schedules 
claiming exemptions under section 522(d). The bankruptcy court held that 
section 522( d) was no longer available to Oregon debtors and ordered the 
Stinsons to file an amended schedule of exemptions. 4o The reason for the 
holding was that: "(F)or purpose of claiming exemptions in the Chapter 7 
case the law applicable to determine what property may be claimed exempt 
is the law in effect at the time of conversion to Chapter 7."41 The reason for 
this statement was that the Stinson court earlier concluded that the date of 
conversion was the appropriate time for determining property of the 
estate.42 
This bankruptcy court decision was overruled by the district court in an 
unreported decision.43 The district court's opinion in Stinson emphasized the 
language of section 522(b)(2)(A) - "state or local law that is applicable on 
the date of the filing of the petition"44 - and the language of section 348 -
"does not effect a change in the date of the filing of the petition."45 
Although the bankruptcy court's decision in Stinson was reversed by the 
federal district court, it has been expressly endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in 
its opinion in In re Lindberg. 46 Other courts that have adopted the date of 
conversion as the date for fixing property of the estate would also probably 
agree with the bankruptcy court in Stinson. 
c. CHANGES IN THE USE, NATURE, OR VALUE OF PROPERTY 
This choice between date of filing and date of conversion also becomes 
important where there is a change in the use, nature, or value of the 
property. 
40Jn re Stinson, 8 CowER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 16 (Banke. Or. 1982), reversed in an unreported de-
cision that was printed as an appendix to In re Kao, 52 Banlrr. 454 (Banlrr. Or. 1985). 
418 CowER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB), at 19. 
428 CoLUER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB), at 18. 
4lWhile the federal district court decision in Stinson was not reported, it has been printed as an ap-
pendix to In re Kao, 52 Banlrr. 452 (Banke. Or. 1985). 
H52 Banke, at 455. 
O[d. 
46735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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Recall that In re Lindberg involved such a change in use. 47 At the time of 
their chapter 13 petition, the Lindbergs lived in the home in New Town and 
claimed this house as their homestead. At the time of the conversion to 
chapter 7, they lived on their farm and wanted to claim the farm as their 
homestead. The Eighth Circuit held that the date of conversion is the impor-
tant date in determining exemptions and allowed the change of exemptions. 
In so ruling the Eighth Circuit relied more on three policy arguments 
than the particulars of statutory language. The court noted that if the date 
of the chapter 13 filing controlled exemption questions, the Lindbergs would 
be required to claim as homestead a house in which they no longer lived and 
this is contrary to both section 522 and state exemption laws.48 Second, in 
other cases, a debtor might lose exemptions because he transferred property 
after his chapter 13 filing, and this is contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's poli-
cy of "fresh start,"49 of "full use of exemption."5o Finally, the court looked to 
the consequences of dismissal, implying that the debtor who converts from 
chapter 13 to chapter 7 should not be treated less favorably that the debtor 
who dismisses his chapter 13 case and then files a new chapter 7 petition.n 
In a chapter 13 case, a debtor has a statutory right to have his case 
dismissed.52 If the case is dismissed and the debtor later files a new chapter 7 
case, exemptions in this new case will be determined as of the time of the 
chapter 7 filing. The Lindberg decision states that it would be "inequitable" 
to provide for a different result for the debtor who instead simply files a mo-
tion to convert. 
In re Winchesters:i is, in some respects, the factual "mirror image" of Lind-
berg. In Winchester, the property in question was exempt as of the date of 
the chapter 13 filing but not as of the date of the order of conversion to 
chapter 7. In their Chapter 13 Statement, the Winchesters claimed their 
home as exempt. Later, they filed a chapter 13 plan that provided for the 
"Id. 
48735 F.2d 1090. 
49Id. 
>0Id. 
"735 F.2d 1091. Remember that the consequences of conversion are very different from the conse-
quences of dismissal and refiling. Consider, for example, the application of section 547 and the other 
avoidance provisions. If the debtor converts his case, the filing of the superseded case remains the relevant 
time for applying section 547's ninety day period and section 548's one year period. Similarly, only trans-
fers that occurred prior to the filing of the superseded case can be challenged under section 544. 545, 547, 
and 548. 
»Section 1307; see In re Benediktsson, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 209 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983); 
H. DRAKE &J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 13.02 (1983); but cf. In re Gillion, 10 
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1354 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1983). 
"12 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 293 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). 
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sale of the house. The plan was confirmed, and the house was sold. The 
Winchesters failed to reinvest the proceeds from this sale within one year as 
required by state exemption law. Later, they converted the case to chapter 
7. In concluding that the proceeds from the sale were not exempt in this 
chapter 7 case, the Bankruptcy Appeals Panel for the Ninth Circuit stated 
"logic dictates that the date of conversion is the controlling date on which to 
determine the debtor's exemptions, and property of the Chapter 7 estate. "s4 
The "logic" can be found in the facts of Winchester. More than two years 
elapsed between the filing of the chapter 13 petition and the conversion to 
chapter 7. A debtor who converts to chapter 7 two or three years after orig, 
inally filing a chapter 13 case may at the time of conversion have completely 
different property from what he owned at the time of the commencement of 
the chapter 13 case. 
Even if the debtor has the same property at both filing and conversion, 
the property will have a different value. The question then arises at what 
point in time should the value of the debtor's property and consequently his 
equity be measured. This question affects the determination not only of 
exemption, but also lien avoidance. 
Section 522(£) permits the avoidance of certain liens on an interest of the 
debtor in property to the extent that the lien impairs a debtor's exemption. 
In order to determine whether a lien impairs a debtor's exemption, the court 
must determine the value of the debtor's equity in the property as of some 
point in time. A debtor's exemption is impaired only to the extent that there 
is insufficient equity to cover both the debtor's exemption and the lien. 
A court that considers the date of conversion as the relevant date of fix, 
ing property of the estate will probably also look to that date for valuing the 
debtor's equity in exempt property.ss Similarly, a court that considers the 
date of filing as the relevant date for fixing property of the estate will prob, 
ably also look to that date of valuing the debtor's equity in exempt 
property.s6 
D. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In dealing with these exemption questions, it is more difficult to find a 
statutory basis for considering post,filing occurrences. Remember, paragraph 
(a) of section 348 makes the date of the initial bankruptcy filing the critical 
date for most purposes. In exemption questions, unlike property of the es, 
tate questions, it is not at all helpful to argue that the case should be treated 
as a chapter 13 case from the time of filing until the time of conversion. 
s•12 Cowm BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB), at 296. 
55See In re Salamone, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 517 (Banlrr. E.D. N.Y. 1984). 
56Cf. In re Dennis, 10 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 930 (Banlrr. M.D. Ga. 1983). 
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While property of the estate in chapter 13 cases is different from property of 
the estate in chapter 7 cases, "exempt property" in chapter 13 cases is not 
different from exempt property in chapter 7 cases. In both chapter 13 cases 
and chapter 7 cases, section 522 determines what property is exempt. 
On the other hand, the policy arguments for considering exemptions is-
sues as of the date of conversion are stronger than the policy arguments for 
determining property of the estate as of the time of conversion. As noted in 
the cases discussed above, the debtor might have completely different prop-
erty at the time of conversion, he might have different needs, and the value 
of the property might have changed. 
Ill. CONVERSION FROM CHAPTER 11 TO CHAPTER 7 AND 
PROOF OF CLAIM 
Creditors are generally required to file proofs of claims. Section llll(a) 
creates a significant exception to this requirement for creditors in a chapter 
11 case. Under section llll(a), creditors whose claims are scheduled by the 
debtor in possession or trustee can participate in the chapter 11 case with-
out filing a proof of claim; such claims are "deemed filed under section 501." 
What if the case is later converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7? Will the 
claims be "deemed filed" in the chapter 7 case? The Third Circuit recently 
provided an affirmative answer to this question in In re Crouthamel Potato 
Chip Co. 57 
In 1979, Crouthamel filed a chapter 11 petition. It included all of its em-
ployees' wage claims in its schedule of debts, and the employees did not file 
proofs of claim. In 1982, the case was converted to chapter 7 and notice was 
mailed to all creditors, including employees, establishing a six month bar 
date for the filing of claims in the chapter 7 case. Again, the employees did 
not file proofs of claim. The chapter 7 trustee filed an objection to the allow-
ance of claims on the ground that they had not been timely filed. The bank-
ruptcy court and the district court upheld this objection. The Third Circuit 
reversed. 
The five page opinion dismisses the trustee's strong arguments based on 
the language of (1) section 103(f),58 (2) Rule 3002(a),59 and (3) Rule 100960 
with the statement in a footnote, "Impressive authorities have warned us 
not to depend too much on the literal interpretation of words of law."61 
57786 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1986). 





1786 F.2d at 145, n.5. 
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Judge Aldisert62 instead relies on "what actually takes place in the real 
world of bankruptcy practice":63 "Requiring a second [second?} filing serves 
little purpose. No person interested in the proceeding will be injured or in-
convenienced, no guarantee diluted if the original claim is recognized in the 
chapter 7 proceeding. "64 
Arguably, Crouthamel's employees are no different from any other 
creditors of a chapter 7 debtor. Arguably, requiring the employees in the 
Crouthamel case to file a proof of claim serves the same purposes as requiring 
any holder of a scheduled claim in a chapter 7 case to file a proof of claim. 
Arguably, the Crouthamel case raises the same question as the cases consid-
ered in the "property of the estate" part of this article: When a case is con-
verted from chapter 11 to chapter 13 to chapter 7, is it necessary to treat it 
as if it were a chapter 7 case from the time of initial filing? 
IV. SOME CONCLUDING COMlvfENTS 
Obviously, section 348 does not expressly provide for all of the conse-
quences of converting a bankruptcy case. Numerous conversion questions 
have not been specifically dealt with by Congress-are left for the courts to 
resolve. 
In resolving these question, the courts should give great weight to the 
principle of finality. Actions taken, decisions made, should not be undone. 
For example, no court has suggested that payments made in a superseded 
chapter 11 or chapter 13 case should be recoverable by the chapter 7 trustee 
or by the debtor. Payments pursuant to a confirmed plan constitute pay-
ments authorized "under this title or by the court" and thus are protected by 
section 549(a)(2)(B). In In re Ford,65 Judge Martin held that section 1107's 
authorization of continuation of business operations prevented a chapter 7 
trustee from recovering payments made prior to confirmation in the super-
seded chapter 11 case. 
It can be argued that when a chapter 13 petition is filed, a decision is 
made with respect to property of the estate. The debtor's postpetition earn-
ings are automatically made property of the estate and protected from the 
reach of creditors by the automatic stay. Under the principle of finality, this 
action should not be undone. 
It can also be argued that when a chapter 13 petition is filed, a decision 
is made with respect to exemptions. Exemptions are listed in chapter 13 
statements. This argument for exemptions is less persuasive than the above 
argument regarding property of the estate. The exemptions claimed by chap-
62Judge Aldisert served as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. 
6l786 F.2d at 145. 
64[d. 
UBANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,188 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1986). 
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ter 13 debtors are of very limited practical significance. As noted by the 
court in In re Winchester, ''The exemptions claimed by the debtor upon the 
filing of their Chapter 13 petition are not really exemptions at all. They are 
merely statements used to show what the debtors would claim as exempt if 
their case were a liquidation case." Accordingly, permitting a debtor to 
choose his exempt property from his property as of the time of conversion to 
chapter 7 does not undo actions taken or decisions made. 
